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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
AnmiNIsTRATIvE LAW-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD-RIGHT OF
EMPLOYEES TO CHANGE UNION AFFILIATION UNDER CLOSED SHOP CONTRACT-
[Federal].-On July 22, 1935, respondent company entered into a contract
for a term of one year with several local affiliates of the A. F. of L. At
the same time an oral agreement1 was reached which provided that all new
employees would have to join the appropriate A. F. of I. affiliates, but the
oral agreement expressly excepted old employees, who had been employed
before June 22, 1935 and who had not authorized the A. F. of L. to repre-
sent them,2 from being required to join any union. In July, 1936, this
contract and the oral agreement were renewed for an additional year. In
March, 1937, the A. F. of L. attempted to organize the plant completely.
During this organizational endeavor, an A. F. of L. agent, accompanied by
respondent's superintendent, approached a number of old employees who
were exempt from the requirement of joining the union. When one of
these employees refused to join, the A. F. of L. agent "fired" him, which
action was approved by the superintendent. This discharge resulted in a
number of employees' consulting a C. I. 0. organizer and subsequently
calling a sit-down strike in the machine shop. The C. I. 0. representatives
proposed a settlement providing for reinstatement of the discharged em-
ployee and a free choice of union affiliation.3 This proposal was accepted
by both the respondent and the representatives of the A. F. of L. But,
before the plant was reopened, the respondent entered into a new contract
with the A. F. of L. providing for a completely closed shop. This contract
was entered into four months before the termination of the then existing
contract. When the plant reopened, the company refused to reinstate 28
1. This oral agreement, the N. L. R. B. found, was not known to the
employees at the time it was made nor were its terms ever made clear to
the employees. The only ones with any real knowledge of its terms were
the respondent and the representatives of the local affiliates of the A. F.
of L. In re Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co. (1938) 8 N. L. R. B. 112, 116.
2. The affiliate of the A. F. of L. claimed a majority of the employees
of the respondent on the basis of written authorizations signed by the
employees giving the union the right to represent them. These authoriza-
tions did not specify how long the union had the power to represent the
employees, but merely provided as a safeguard the right of withdrawal on
thirty days' notice. This method of ascertaining which union had the
majority is out-moded. Generally, at the present time, the union applies to
the N. L. R. B. for certification as the union having the majority of
employees. The N. L. R. B. then provides for an election by the employees
to determine the question, under see. 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations
Act. National Labor Relations Act (1935) 49 Stat. 453, c. 372, 29 U. S.
C. A. §159. See also, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies,
Monograph of the Attorney General's Committee On Administrative Pro-.
cedure, Part 5, National Labor Relations Board (1941) 30 et seq.
3. Although the Board's findings did not make clear how this free choice
of union affiliation was to be determined, it can safely be assumed that what
was asked was a certification proceeding under see. 9 (c) of the act.
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former employees.4 The C. I. 0. petitioned the National Labor Relations
Board, charging discrimination on the part of the company under section
7 of the National Labor Relations Act.5 The Board found that the action
of the company was discriminatory and ordered reinstatement of 22 em-
ployees and the payment of back wages to 24 employees. 6 In addition the
Board ordered the company "to cease giving effect to any provision of the
new 1937 contract ' 7 On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals held:
that the acts of respondent did not constitute unfair labor practices under
the National Labor Relations Act, but were justified by section 8 (3)8 of
the act as a valid attempt to enforce the union contract. National Labor
Relations Board -v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co.9
4. Four employees were employed by the respondent prior to June 22,
1985, and had worked till the plant had closed down and never belonged
to the A. F. of L. Fourteen other employees who were not taken back
were also employed by the respondent prior to June 22, 1935, were members
of the A. F. of L., but had become members of the United, (the affiliate
of the C. I. 0.) during the lockout. Five of the other employees who were
not returned were employed by the respondent subsequent to June 22, 1935,
had been members of the A. F. of L., but had also joined the C. I. 0.
during the lockout by the respondent.
One of these employees who was not rehired had worked for the re-
spondent for 11 years and had not joined the C. I. 0. affiliate, although he
had been discussing with other employees at the plant the desirability of
joining. The complaints of the other four employees involved were dis-
missed. In re Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co. (1938) 8 N. L. R. B. 112, 119-
121.
5. National Labor Relations Act (1935) 49 Stat. 452, c. 372, §7, 29
U. S. C. A. §157, "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own chosing, and to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion."
6. In re Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co. (1938) 8 N. L. R. B. 112, 128-129.
7. Id. at 128.
8. National Labor Relations Act (1935) 49 Stat. 452, c. 372, §8, 29
U. S. C. A. §158, "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title. * * * (3) By discrimination
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organiza-
tion: Provided, That nothing in this chapter * * * shall preclude an
employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not estab-
lished, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this chapter as an
unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership
therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees
as provided in section 159 (a) of this title, in the appropriate collective
bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made."
9. (C. C. A. 6, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 611. The statement of facts in the
instant case is gathered from the Board's decision as well as from the
court's decision. There seems to be some difference of opinion between the
court and the Board as to whether the respondent was guilty of discrimi-
natory acts or not; the Board found the respondent guilty of discrimina-
tion, In re Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co. (1938) 8 N. L. R. B. 112, 127,
while the court could find no discrimination on the established facts. N. L.
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The whole question of the rights of employees to change union affilia-
tion during the existence of a valid union contract is not settled either by
the decisions of the Board or by the decisions of the courts.10 It has been
said that where there is an existing contract the Board will generally
allow a hearing and will make provision for an election to determine which
union has a majority of the employees, when such a change in union
affiliation occurs; subject to the qualification that a petition for certifica-
tion to the Board by a union newly formed by such a change in affiliation
will not be heard within the year after the union contract is signed.11
A perusal of some of the cases, however, shows much confusion on this
issue. In In re United Fruit Co.,12 the Board ruled that when a valid
closed shop contract exists, discharge for joining a rival union is a defense
10. The C. I. 0., A. F. of L., and the Labor Mediation Board have done
little to clarify the problem, as all three have presented different solutions.
"The C. I. 0. position, as stated by its counsel, Lee Pressman, is that
a collective contract should not bar a change of representatives during its
existence but that the Board should act only in case 'the union claiming
the new majority' can show that the shift was 'overwhelming', even though
it will need only a bare majority at the board election to be certified as
the new representative. The position is open to the objection that it aban-
dons the principle of majority rule, which is the only basis for recognizing
a change of representatives during the existence of a contract. This posi-
tion likewise raises difficult administrative problems in determining what is
an 'overwhelming shift." Rosenfarb, The National Labor Policy and How
It Works (1940) 272.
"One of the A. F. of L. proposals for amendment (of the National Labor
Relations Act) provides that: 'Change of membership in or of affiliation
with or withdrawal from a labor organization shall not impair the rights
conferred by this Act on such exclusive bargaining agent until either (1)
the term of any written contract made by it with an employer has expired
or (2) one year from the date of execution of such contract (where the
contract extends beyond one year) has elapsed, whichever is first reached.
Such labor organization shall have an interest in its own right in said
contract for said period.' This provision apparently seeks to enact into
law the present position of the board on the issue." Rosenfarb, The National
Labor Policy and How It Works (1940) 268.
"The position of the Labor Mediation Board, as revealed in the argu-
ment of Alex F. Whitney, the head of the Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men, (2 N. L. R. B. 290) is that it will recognize a change of representa-
tives during the existence of a contract, closed-shop or otherwise, unless the
contracting union has been certified by the Mediation Board, in which case
it will not intervene for a year after the certification." Rosenfarb, The
National Labor Policy and How It Works (1940) 273.
11. 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940) 528-529,
§177. Even this authority cites thirteen exceptions to this rule. 2 Teller,
Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940) 903-906, §335.
It is important to note that in other cases, In re H. Margolin & Co.(1938) 9 N. L. R. B. 852; In re Alabama By-Products Corp. (1939) 13
N. L. R. B. 427; In re Heldman-Schild-Lasser, Inc. (1939) 11 N. L. R. B.
1289; In re F. E. Booth & Co. (1939) 10 N. L. R. B. 1491, the Board has
stated that it might make an investigation after the signing of the union
contract for the purpose of negotiating a new contract when the existing
contract expires. Such investigations are usually granted when the time
for renewal of the contract is near.
12. (1939) 12 N. L. R. B. 404.
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to charges of discrimination under the act. Again in In re Ansley Radio
Corp.,I s where a majority in the unit shifted allegiance from the contract-
ing union to another union a few months after entering into a one year
closed shop contract, the Board held that the contract justified the employer
in discharging those who shifted their membership. Likewise, in In re J. E.
Pearce Contracting and Stevedoring Co.,14 a change of union affiliation by
a majority of the respondent's employees during the life of a preferential
contract was held by the Board not to terminate this contract, and the
employer's refusal to bargain collectively with this new union was held
not discriminatory under the act. Generally the courts have been more
conservative than the National Labor Relations Board in recognizing change
in union affiliation under an existing contract.15 For example, in In re
M & M Woodworking Co.,' 6 the employer made a closed shop contract with
a local affiliate of the A. F. of L. This local, shortly after signing the
contract, withdrew from the A. F. of L. and affiliated with the C. I. 0.
The employer, faced with a boycott of his goods by the A. F. of L., dis-
charged the employees who had transferred to the C. I. 0. The Board held
that inasmuch as the contract was with the local, the local was not changed
by the change in affiliation, since its withdrawal from the A. F. of L. was
in accordance with the latter's constitution, and the employer, therefore,
could not legally require membership in the old A. F. of L. affiliate as a
condition of employment. A majority of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the Board's order on the ground that the old A. F. of L. local
remained in existence.1 In In Te Peninsular and Occidental S. S. Co.,18
the Board found an employer guilty of discrimination for discharging em-
13. (1939) 18 N. L. R. B. 1028.
14. (1940) 20 N. L. R. B. 1061.
15. It is interesting to note that the court, in the instant case, relies on
N. L. R. B. v. Sands Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 721, aff'd
806 U. S. 382, as authority for the fact that the National Labor Relations
Act does not prohibit an effective discharge for repudiation by the employee
of his agreement. The court says, "The Board, therefore, erred as to its
order finding the respondent guilty of discrimination with reference to 18
of the 24 employees named in the order because these 18 were members of
A. F. of L. affiliates, were bound by the contract until June, 1937, and were
compelled to be in good union standing in order to continue in respondent's
employ." N. L. R. B. v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1941)
120 F. (2d) 611, 616.
The Sands Mfg. Co. case did not involve a change of union affiliation
under an existing contract, but a breach by a union of the seniority pro-
visions of the collective bargaining contract which it had with the employer.
The employer, after the union had chosen to allow the employer to call a
lay-off of its employees rather than abide by the seniority provision of the
contract, hired men who belonged to another union to work in his machine
shop. The Sands Mfg. Co. case and the instant case have nothing in com-
mon either on the basis of factual similarity or on the labor problem in-
volved.
16. (1987) 6 N. L. R. B. 372.
17. M & M Wood Working Co. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 9, 1939) 101 F.
(2d) 938.
18. (1938) 5 N. L. R. B. 959.
1942]
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ployees who had changed their union affiliation during the existence of a
preferential contract. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appealslo
reversed the order and sustained the discharges on the ground that inter-
union conflicts in maritime employment are too perilous to the public
safety to be permitted. 20
In reaching a conclusion opposed to that of the Board, the court in the
instant case engaged in devious reasoning. It first determined that closed
shop contracts were recognized and permitted by section 8 (3) of the
National Labor Relations Act.21 Once such a contract was entered into,
the court said, "they [the employees who had authorized the A. F. of L.
affiliato to represent them] were both ethically and legally bound not to
disrupt the contract."22 Any act, therefore, which would, in any way, be
likely to endanger the complete effectiveness of the contract, would be
prohibited. Joining another union, or even talking about joining another
union, would tend to decrease the efficiency of the contract, and would,
therefore, justify the employer in discharging any employee who engaged
in such activities. The Board, it is important to note, did not treat the
1936 contract as a closed shop contract, but as a preferential contract. 23
The court, however, said: "It is immaterial whether the men considered
the contract as establishing a closed shop or preferential shop. The con-
tracts were in the nature of closed shop agreements, for eventually, as old
men [who were exempted from having to join the A. F. of L.] dropped
out, if the contracts were renewed a genuine closed shop would be estab-
lished."24 The court's attitude toward the contract, therefore, is that since
it was "almost" a closed shop agreement it should be treated as "if it
were one." Armed with this reasoning the court then said that the em-
ployees who signed authorizations gave the A. F. of L. power to enter
into collective bargaining agreements in their behalf, and that these em-
ployees were bound to support these agreements. 5 But the court went
further and held that because the 1936 contract was in the nature of a
closed shop agreement, employees who did not belong to the A. F. of L.,
who had not signed authorizations and who were not required to join the
A. F. of L. could be discharged solely because they "advocated" member-
ship in another union. 2 8 This line of reasoning is pernicious. If it is fol-
19. Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 5, 1938)
98 F. (2d) 411, cert. den. N. L. R. B. v. Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co.
(1938) 305 U. S. 653.
20. In this case there was a possibility of mutiny through inter-union
strife and this may have influenced the court's decision. It would be wiser,
perhaps, to restrict the decision of this case to those cases involving similar
situations on the high seas.
21. (1935) 49 Stat. 452, c. 372 §8, 29 U. S. C. A. §158.
22. (C. C. A. 6, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 611, 616.
23. In re Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co. (1938) 8 N. L. R. B. 112, 116.
24. N. L. R. B. v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1941) 120
F. (2d) 611, 615.
25. See id. at 617.
26. Although the court did not state this as a fact in its decision, the
effect of the court's decision was to uphold the employer in not rehiring
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lowed, it would prevent either a majority or a minority of employees, once
a contract has been made with a particular union, from participating in any
move to change union affiliation. 27 Thus, a union could perpetually enter
into a new contract before the termination of the old contract and effec-
tively2s silence any dissident voices among its ranks or among non-union
employees. What if the employees decided that a different form of union,
either craft or industrial, would more effectively meet their needs? What
if the officers of the union looked upon their positions as vested interests
and were not actually furthering the interests of the members?29
If maintenance of industrial peace is the peg upon which the Board and
the courts are to hang their decisions, it would seem advisable not to
freeze the relations between employer and employees for any given period.30
The reason for this is that a majority of the members of a union are not
going to want to change affiliation to satisfy mere whims; the desire to
change will almost universally be motivated by some underlying economic
question or by the fact that the existing union is not working satisfactorily.
Unions should be free to function democratically. Prohibiting changes in
union affiliation during the life of an existing contract and denying even
the mere advocacy of such change seems to stifle the democratic processes
of the unions, and is bound to lead to intra-union strife and instability
generally in labor conditions. It might be argued that the employer is
entitled to the security of having the contract enforced against his employees
for the duration of the time specified in the contract.31 Such a security
an employee who had not changed union affiliation, but who had merely dis-
cussed the possibility of his doing so with the other employees. It is inter-
esting to note that the court, in the instant case, seemed prejudiced against
the employees who advocated change in union affiliation, referring to
them as "agitators" and to their activities as "agitation." N. L. R. B. v.
Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 611, 614, 617.
27. In the instant case, one employee was not rehired, who had not
changed union affiliation under the existing contract but had merely dis-
cussed the possibility of changing his union affiliation. The question neces-
sarily arises, granted that an employee cannot actually change union affilia-
tion during the life of the contract, can he be discharged for mere advocacy
of change of affiliation? The Board's position seemed to be stated in In re
Ansley Radio Corp. (1939) 18 N. L. R. B. 1028, 1042-1043, where it was
said that it was discriminatory to discharge employees for mere talk and
advocacy of change in affiliation during the life of an existing union con-
tract in the absence of an express provision in the existing union contract,
requiring abstention from such advocacy or talk.
28. In the instant case, the 1937 contract was renewed four months
before the expiration of the 1936 contract. Thus, under the instant court's
decision forbidding any change of union affiliation or mere advocacy of
change during the existence of the contract, there is no telling how often
the A. F. of L. representatives could renew this contract in like manner.
29. Nick v. U. S. (C. C. A. 8, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 660.
30. Rosenfarb, The National Labor Policy and How It Works (1940)
268.
31. Id. at 272. "It is no answer to say that, if the employees want to
change their representatives during the existence of a contract, they can
wait until the contract expires. Time is of the essence in industrial rela-
tions. Discontent among the rank and file with their representatives during
1942]
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would be an illusion. Efficient productivity is more likely to arise when
employees are operating through a union which they want to represent
them than when they are forced to accept a union which no longer has their
support. The solution seems to lie in a change in the concept of the col-
lective bargaining contract. Such a contract should run with the majority
of the employees in a given collective bargaining unit instead of with the
union obtaining the contract.3 2
H. M. F.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDom OF PRESS AND RELIGION-LICENSE TAX
ON PSUOICALS--[Aizona].-Appellant was convicted of selling religious
periodicals without having paid for a license as required by municipal ordi-
nance. Held: The ordinance did not violate constitutional guarantee of
freedom of religion or freedom of speech and press. State v. Jobin.1
Freedom of speech, press, and religion are protected against invasion by
state action by the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution
extending the restrictions of the 1st Amendment to the states. These rights
are, of course, subject to the reasonable exercise of the state's police power.2
In recent years many cases have arisen testing state and municipal power
to restrict the distribution of handbills, pamphlets, and other literature.
The requirement of a permit from a designated public official for the dis-
tribution of literature has been held to be unconstitutional as a violation
of freedom of speech and press.2 However, where the issuance of the per-
mit is non-discretionary in the public official and is merely for the purpose
of reasonable regulation and insuring obedience to the general laws, the
the existence of a contract would be effectively stifled by the contracting
union through discharges obtained by the time the contract expired, and
meanwhile disaffection would break out into industrial strife if employees
would have to deal with the employer through representatives who do not
represent them. It must be remembered that collective bargaining does not
end with the signing of a contract. Negotiation as to grievances is part of
the process of collective bargaining. The grievance machinery would sputter
and halt if the employees had no confidence in their representatives."
32. Rosenfarb, The National Labor Policy and How It Works (1940)
275.
1. (Ariz. 1941) 118 P. (2d) 97.
2. Davis v. Beason (1890) 133 U. S. 333 (polygamy); Ex parte Westelli-
son (1927) 38 Okla. Crim. Rep. 207, 259 Pac. 873, (unnecessary noise in
announcing contents of newspapers in selling) ; but cf. De Jonge v. Oregon
(1937) 299 U. S. 353, (criminal syndicalism); Herndon v. Lowry (1937)
301 U. S. 242 (attempt to incite insurrection).
3. Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938) 303 U. S. 444; Schneider v. State of
New Jersey (1939) 308 U. S. 147; State ex rel. Wilson v. Russell (Fla.
1941) 1 So. (2d) 569; Village of South Holland v. Stein (1940) 373 Ill.
472, 26 N. E. (2d) 868, 127 A. L. R. 957; Commonwealth v. Pascone (1941)
308 Mass. 591, 33 N. E. (2d) 522; Harder v. Shahadi (1940) 125 N. J. L.
153, 14 A. (2d) 475; Star Co. v. Brush (1918) 172 N. Y. S. 320, 104 Misc.
404. Accord: Hague v. C. I. 0. (1939) 307 U. S. 496; Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut (1940) 310 U. S. 296, 128 A. L. R. 1352.
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